The recent accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco were related to the misrepresentation of liabilities. We provide a structural model of correlated multi-firm default, in which public bond investors are uncertain about the liability-dependent barrier at which individual firms default. Investors form prior beliefs on the barriers, which they update with the default status information of firms arriving over time. Whenever a firm suddenly defaults, investors learn about the default threshold of closely associated business partner firms. This updating leads to ''contagious'' jumps in credit spreads of business partners. We characterize joint default probabilities and the default dependence structure as assessed by investors, where we emphasize the the modeling of dependence with copulas. A case study based on Brownian asset dynamics illustrates our results.
Introduction
A number of studies have investigated historical bond price and default data. They found, quite plausibly, that credit spreads as well as aggregate default rates are strongly related to general macro-economic factors such as the level of default-free interest rates (see, for example, Duffee, 1998; Keenan, 2000) . Due to their joint dependence on smoothly varying common variables, credit spreads across firms are smoothly correlated through time. This might be called cyclical default correlation.
Another observation is that sudden large changes or jumps in spreads across several issuers do not seem to appear independently from each other. In its extreme form, a sudden spread change of one issuer, possibly due to a rating downgrade, a news announcement, or a default, leads to a simultaneous market-wide response in spreads. That is, an event specific to one entity in the first place may have an immediate economic or perceived impact on other entities, which finds its expression in a cascade of subsequent spread changes. In analogy to the literature on financial crises, for example Allen and Gale (2000) , we will refer to this particular pattern as contagion. A recent example is the default of Argentina and the associated immediate spread widening on debt of other South American countries, most notably Brazil. On the corporate debt markets, similar phenomena can be observed: the default of Enron caused substantial adverse changes in the spreads on several utility companies throughout the US. One explanation of such contagion effects is the existence of close ties between firms. In general, these links are of legal (e.g. parent-subsidiary), financial (e.g. trade credit), or business nature (e.g. buyer-supplier). It is easy to imagine that through these channels economic distress of one firm can have an immediate adverse effect on the financial health of that firmÕs business partners. This distress propagation is accompanied by a prompt jump in spreads on the involved firmsÕ debt, which reflects the marketÕs re-assessment of their default probabilities.
In this paper we provide a model for correlated defaults, where we emphasize the contagion phenomena associated with direct ties between firms. A thorough understanding of the mechanisms behind contagion is of crucial importance in several respects. From a banking regulatory perspective, contagion phenomena may endanger the stability of the financial system. Suddenly appearing large-scale adverse spread changes cause typically excessive losses in banksÕ credit portfolios. The distress of lending institutions has typically adverse effects on the entire financial system. Here it is the non-smooth nature of contagion processes in comparison with cyclical default correlations, which generates suddenly large losses that need to be buffered promptly. The design of effective capital provisions requires explicit models for contagion phenomena.
The existence of contagion plays also an important role in the pricing and hedging of multi-name credit derivatives, which offer insurance against spread changes and defaults of several underlying instruments, bonds for example. Suppose we want to hedge a position in a first-to-default swap, which provides a payoff upon the first default in some basket of bonds, in return for a periodic payment. We then sell protection via plain-vanilla default swaps on each bond in the basket. In case a default event occurs, we receive the first-to-default payment, pay the default premium in the plain-vanilla swap corresponding to the first defaulter, and unwind the remaining vanilla swaps. Given direct ties between the issuers, for the latter transaction we have to account for the fact that a spread jump in the remaining bonds in the basket may follow the first defaulter. This would adversely affect the economics of the hedge. For the control of this hedging risk we need again an explicit model for the contagion effects in defaults and spreads.
Corporate defaults and credit spreads on corporate debt can be basically modeled via two distinct approaches, the intensity-based approach and the structural ap-proach. In the former, default is an unpredictable event whose stochastic structure is prescribed by an intensity process. The intensity models the conditional default arrival rate per unit time. To induce correlation between defaults, one would typically introduce correlation between the intensity processes (Duffie and Singleton, 1998; Garleanu, 2001, Jarrow et al., 2000, for example) . One way to do this is by letting intensities of several firms be driven by common variables, for instance riskless interest rates, which would correspond to the observed credit spread correlation across firms due to dependence on general economic factors (cyclical correlation). A disadvantage of this setup is that defaults are conditionally independent given the intensities; contagion effects cannot arise as long as intensities are smoothly varying. To impose a stronger degree of default correlation and model contagion effects, one can let intensities experience correlated jumps, or directly construct a firmÕs intensity to jump upon defaults of other firms. This is essentially the path followed by several recent contributions, for example Jarrow and Yu (2001) , Davis and Lo (2001) , Avellaneda and Wu (2001) , Sch€ onbucher and Schubert (2001), CollinDufresne et al. (2002) , and Giesecke and Weber (2002) .
While in the ad hoc intensity-based approach the default event and the associated intensity is typically given exogenously, the structural approach takes the cause and effect nature of default as a starting point. Taking the dynamics of a firmÕs asset value as given, a default takes place if the assets fall to some lower threshold. Here, with a typically continuous asset process, defaults are, however, predictable, meaning that they are not surprise events any more. Indeed, at any time investors know the nearness of the assets to the default threshold, so that they are warned in advance when a default is imminent. This implies that investors would not demand a default premium for short-term debt, which is not plausible and also at odds with empirical observations. In the structural approach, cyclical default correlation between issuers is easily introduced through asset correlation; this is the approach taken by the standard industry models KMV (Kealhofer, 1998) and CreditMetrics (Gupton et al., 1997) . With predictable defaults, however, jumps in bond prices and credit spreads cannot appear at all: prices converge continuously to their default-contingent values. This means that, although the existing structural approaches provide important insights into the relation between firmsÕ fundamentals and correlated default events as well as practically most valuable tools, they fail to be consistent in particular with the observed contagion phenomena.
In this paper we provide a structural model of correlated default which is consistent with several significant credit spread characteristics: the implied short-term credit spreads are typically non-zero, credit spreads display cyclical correlations across firms, and, most importantly, contagion effects are predicted. Our key assumption is that issuersÕ fundamental characteristics are not completely transparent to public bond investors on the secondary market. Unlike the incomplete observation model of Duffie and Lando (2001) , we suppose that the threshold level at which a firmÕs management liquidates the firm is not publicly known. The threshold level is some function of the firmÕs liabilities, whose total amount is inside firm information. This sensitive information is usually not fully disclosed to the public market; only rarely there is an incentive to do so. A case in point are the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco. Similar informational assumptions appear in Lambrecht and Perraudin (1996) and in the CreditGrades Model, which was recently published by the RiskMetrics Group (2002) .
With incomplete information investors are not able to precisely assess the nearness of the assets to the default threshold, so that the default becomes a totally unpredictable event, as in the intensity-based approach. This implies that credit spreads are generally non-zero, even for short maturities. Non-vanishing short-term spreads can be seen as ''transparency spreads'', and recent empirical evidence in this direction is presented by Yu (2002) . The specific shape of the term structure of credit spreads depends on the relation of the current asset value to the historical low of assets; see Giesecke (2001) for an analysis. Since defaults are unanticipated surprise events, jumps in spreads and bond prices at or around default will appear, in line with empirical observations. In addition, time series of default probabilities implied by our assumptions seem to fit historical data better than those implied by the usual perfect-information model (as employed by KMVÕs standard industry model, for example). For more details in that respect we refer to Giesecke and Goldberg (2003) .
In lack of perfect information, bond investors form a prior distribution on firmsÕ default thresholds. This prior reflects the publicly known fact that firms can have close ties between each other, in the sense that the default thresholds of directly linked firms are not independent of each other. For example, it is easy to imagine that for two firms in a parent-subsidiary relationship the respective debt levels, which are intimately connected to the default threshold, are not independent. For two firms in a trade credit, the credit-granting supplier has to appropriately fund the credit to the buyer, which affects its liability side. This means the liabilities of both firms in the transaction cannot be considered independent, giving rise to dependence in the respective default thresholds as functions of liability levels.
In view of the connections between firms, bond investors will rationally use any available information on the public market to assess the default threshold of a particular firm. From observing assets and defaults of all firms in the market, investors learn over time about the characteristics of individual firms. Put another way, investors update their threshold belief with the information continuously arriving over time. Specifically, the non-default status of a firm reveals that the firmÕs unobservable (non-time varying) default threshold must be below the historic low of the firmÕs asset value. In the event of a default, the precise value of the threshold level becomes public knowledge.
Together with the updated a posteriori default threshold belief, an assumption on the (joint) asset dynamics provides a model for the evolution of (joint) default probabilities and bond prices from the viewpoint of the incompletely informed public bond market. Over time, default probabilities and hence credit spreads display a characteristic jump pattern, which corresponds to the idea of contagion of distress between firms. If some firm in the market unpredictably defaults, investors immediately update their threshold belief on all those remaining firms which have close ties to the defaulted firm. This discontinuity in the information arrival leads to a jump in default probabilities and spreads of all affected remaining firms, corresponding to a reassessment of those firmsÕ financial health. Indeed, if we imagine two firms in a trade credit, the default of the buyer can immediately adversely affect the supplier, whose default probability is therefore likely to jump upwards.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the model. We begin in Section 3 with an analysis of the complete information case. In Section 4, we consider the incomplete information case. Describing dependence between random variables by copula functions, we study joint conditional default probabilities, the default dependence structure, and the implied contagion effects. We illustrate our general results in an example in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs.
Model setup
We consider an economy with a financial market. Uncertainty in the economy is modeled by a probability measure P . Investors are assumed to be risk-neutral; on the financial market they can trade in bonds issued by several firms. The finite index set of all firms is denoted I ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng. We take as given some R n -valued stochastic process V ¼ ðV 1 ; . . . ; V n Þ, on which investors agree, and we denote by ðF t Þ t P 0 the filtration generated by V . The process V i ¼ ðV i t Þ t P 0 is continuous and normalized to satisfy
t is a sufficient statistic for the expected discounted future cash flows of firm i as seen from time t. We will therefore call V i asset process. The running minimum asset process ðM i t Þ t P 0 is defined by M i t ¼ minfV i s j 0 6 s 6 tg; so that M i t denotes the historical low of the asset value in the period ½0; t. A firm has issued non-callable consol bonds, paying coupons at some constant rate as long as the firm operates. When a firm stops servicing the coupon, we say it defaults. It then enters financial distress and some form of corporate reorganization takes place. Consistent with this time-homogeneous capital structure, bond investors suppose that there is a vector of random default thresholds D ¼ ðD 1 ; . . . ; D n Þ, such that firm i defaults as soon as its asset value falls to the level D i < 0. The thresholds D are assumed to be independent of assets V . The random default time is thus given by
and we set s ¼ ðs 1 ; . . . ; s n Þ. By convention,
With the running minimum asset process M i we obtain immediately
meaning that the event of default before time t is equivalent to the event that the assets of the firm have been below the default barrier at least once in ½0; t.
Complete information
We begin by considering the case where the public bond market is assumed to have perfect information about the default characteristics of firms; this is the assumption made in all existing structural models of correlated default. We thus describe the public information flow by the filtration ðG t Þ t P 0 defined by
meaning that at time t, the market knows firmsÕ asset values up to t and their default thresholds. This implies, given the continuity of the asset process, that defaults are predictable by public bond investors. This means that the default is announced by a sequence of observable phenomena, such as the asset value falling dangerously close to the default boundary. Loosely, over sufficiently short-time horizons there is no uncertainty about the default any more. It is proved in Giesecke (2001) that this implies credit spreads going to zero with maturity going to zero, meaning that investors will not demand a default risk premium for short-maturity debt. Moreover, the predictability implies that bond prices converge continuously to their recovery values; there are no surprise jumps at or around default announcement. These predictions are neither intuitively nor empirically plausible.
Let us turn to the modeling of default correlation in this setup of complete information. Cyclical correlation arising from the dependence of firms on common smoothly varying (macro-) economic factors, is naturally introduced through mutually dependent asset values. For example, the asset value of firms heavily dependent on the oil price will vary with the oil price over time, leading to correlation in the assets of these firms over time. The correlated evolution of firmsÕ assets is described by the process V , whose specific form is unanimously fixed by investors. The chosen dynamics determine immediately the distribution function H i ðÁ; tÞ of the assetÕs historical low M i t for t > 0, which is the relevant quantity in our model, see (2). The dependence between assets also immediately induces the dependence structure between the historical low processes M i . This dependence structure is formally described by the copula 1 C M t 1 ;...;tn of the vector ðM
; . . . ; M n tn Þ. Together with the marginals H i ðÁ; tÞ, the copula C M specifies the joint distribution function of ðM
for all fixed t i > 0 and all x i 6 0. This representation is unique if the marginals H i ðx; tÞ are continuous in x for fixed t.
Example 3.1. Suppose V is an n-dimensional Brownian motion with some covariance matrix R. Then H i ðx; ÁÞ is the well-known inverse Gaussian distribution function for fixed x 6 0, and C M is the corresponding inverse Gaussian copula 2 with covariance matrix R. Here the joint distribution of firmsÕ historical asset lows is uniquely specified by (4).
There is an interesting relation to an important default model class. In fact, for fixed horizon T , we can view the historical asset low M i T as a latent variable with associated cut-off level D i , so that ðM i T ; D i Þ i2I can be considered as a latent variable de-1 We refer to Nelsen (1999) for a comprehensive introduction to copula functions. 2 Given the multivariate inverse Gaussian distribution function, a corollary to SklarÕs theorem (see Nelsen, 1999) allows to derive the inverse Gaussian copula function. The former can be found in Iyengar (1985) or Rebholz (1994) , for example.
fault model in the sense of Frey and McNeil (2001) and Frey and McNeil (2002) . The choice of the assetÕs running minimum M i T as the latent variable provides a new example for this popular class of models, which includes, for instance, the asset-based models of KMV and CreditMetrics. The latter consider the asset value V i T at the horizon (debt maturity) T as the latent variable, implying that the path the asset value has taken before T does not matter. In fact, the asset value may be well below the cutoff level D i before T without causing a default, if it only exceeds D i at T . From bond investorsÕ perspective, this is very unsatisfactory since it can lead to very low recovery values unless they can intervene and force a liquidation of the firm if assets first cross some lower threshold (Black and Cox, 1976) . From equity investorsÕ or managementÕs perspective, this path independence is unrealistic as well, since it may be optimal for them to liquidate well before the debt matures at T (see Leland, 1994 , for example). We address this criticism by allowing a firm to default at any time before the horizon T , given its asset value V i falls to the threshold D i . This choice leads to a latent variable model based on the assetsÕ historical low M instead on the assets V itself.
The conceptual advantage of separating the dependence structure C M from the marginals H i of the latent variables M i becomes apparent if we consider joint conditional default probabilities, given the complete information of the public bond market:
for T i > t (the second line follows immediately from (2)).
Example 3.2. Suppose there has been no default by time t. Assuming that assets V follow a Markov process with stationary increments, by (4) we get
This formula offers in fact a general multivariate copula representation of ZhouÕs (2001) recent result, who directly computed F 0 ðT ; T Þ in case n ¼ 2. Conditional default probabilities of individual firms are simply given by
It is obvious that joint default probabilities F t critically depend on the nature of the copula C M , i.e. the dependence structure of the latent variables M i . Moreover, we have the following result relating C M to the copula C s of the default time vector s, which describes the complete non-linear default dependence structure (see Section 4.3). Given the marginal default probabilities
s is given by the copula C M of the historical asset low. This means that the statistical properties of C M determine the likelihood of joint defaults, and in particular the tail of the aggregate default loss distribution, cf. Frey and McNeil (2001) . We mention here copulas C M displaying lower tail dependence, i.e. copulas having a pronounced tendency to generate low values in all marginals simultaneously (for a formal definition see Nelsen, 1999) . In comparison with copulas displaying asymptotic independence, such copulas would induce a higher likelihood of all firmsÕ historical asset lows being simultaneously low, corresponding to a higher likelihood of observing joint defaults and large aggregate default losses. From the viewpoint of the default copula C s a similar conclusion can be made: lower tail dependence implies a higher likelihood of early default for a large number of firms simultaneously, meaning a higher probability of large aggregate losses before a given horizon.
The sensitivity of the latent variable model ðM (4). Moreover, if the marginals H i ðx; T Þ are continuous in x, then the joint distribution is uniquely defined. Following Example 3.1, a natural choice for continuous marginals appears to be inverse Gaussian, which would correspond to the standard assumption of assets V i following a Brownian motion. While the corresponding latent variable copula C M T ;...;T would be inverse Gaussian, alternative choices seem equally plausible. Obvious examples include the Gaussian or the Student-t-copula. Frey and McNeil (2001) analyze alternative latent variable copulas for the latent variable model ðV i T ; D i Þ i2I for V i following a Brownian motion. Finally, we observe that with perfect information about assets and default thresholds contagion effects cannot appear in this model. As discussed in the Introduction, contagion phenomena correspond to the conditional default probability F i t ðT Þ of firm i experiencing a jump upon the default of some closely related firm. This jump would reflect the immediate re-assessment of firm iÕs financial health in light of the default of some closely linked firm. Inspection of (6) shows, however, that other firmsÕ default status does not matter for F i t ðT Þ, ruling out cascading reactions. Moreover, given assets follow a sufficiently irregular process (so that H i ðt; xÞ is continuous in t), the predictability of defaults rules out any jumps in the default probability.
Incomplete information
We now consider the situation when the default characteristics of firms are not completely transparent to investors in the public bond market. The recent accounting scandals surrounding Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, revealed that the level of the liabilities is often (intentionally) not fully disclosed to the public. Motivated by this, we relax the unrealistic perfect information assumption of the previous section and suppose that the default threshold of a firm, being some function of liabilities, is unknown to bond investors. Again in line with the existing models, investors can observe the asset values of the firms, as well as defaults in the market as they occur.
4 From now on, the corresponding public information filtration ðG t Þ is therefore defined by
where a^b denotes the minimum of a and b. Similar informational assumptions, though in different one-firm setups, appear in Lambrecht and Perraudin (1996) and in the CreditGrades Model, which was recently published by the RiskMetrics Group (2002). Hull and White (2000a) and Avellaneda and Zhu (2001) take the threshold to be an unknown deterministic function of time and estimate it from observed defaultable bond prices. In contrast to the perfect information case, with incomplete information investors do not know the exact distance of a firmÕs assets to its default threshold. Therefore the default hits the market by surprise, it is totally unpredictable. It is shown in Giesecke (2001) , that this implies positive short-term credit spreads whenever the firmÕs assets are close to their historical lows. Here short spreads can be seen as a transparency premium; see Yu (2002) for a recent empirical analysis in this direction. Moreover, a transparency premium applies to all maturities, so that spreads are generally above those implied by a comparable complete information model. In a comprehensive empirical analysis Huang and Huang (2000) found that the existing complete information models generate counterfactually low credit spreads once they are calibrated to historical data. Incomplete information thus provides a potential solution to these difficulties with structural models. In Giesecke (2001) , it is shown that the specific shape of the term structure of credit spreads depends on the riskiness of the firm, measured in terms of the distance of assets to their all-time low. Due to the surprise nature of default, bond prices and credit spreads will jump to their defaultcontingent values upon the default event; they do not continuously converge to these values as with complete information. As for time series of default probabilities, the empirical analysis of Giesecke and Goldberg (2003) shows that incomplete default threshold observation leads to plausible default probability forecasts.
Threshold prior and learning
Lacking precise information on the default thresholds of the firms, for each firm i 2 I investors agree at time t ¼ 0 on a continuous and strictly increasing prior distribution function G i on the threshold D i , which we take as given. This prior describes the uncertainty surrounding firm iÕs threshold D i with respect to idiosyncratic factors, such as those related to the firmÕs (perceived) capital structure. Besides idiosyncratic factors, default thresholds of several firms may be driven by common, or partly systematic factors. This is closely related to the existence of direct ties between firms, which are often of legal (e.g. parent-subsidiary), financial (e.g. trade credit), or business (e.g. buyer-supplier) nature. Such direct ties give rise to dependence between firmsÕ default thresholds. For example, it is easy to imagine that for two firms in a parent-subsidiary relationship the respective debt levels, which are intimately connected to the default threshold, are not independent. For two firms in a trade credit, the credit-granting supplier has to appropriately fund the credit to the buyer, which affects its liability side. This means the liabilities of both firms in the transaction cannot be considered independent, giving rise to dependence in the respective default thresholds as functions of liability levels.
Besides on the marginal priors G i , at time t ¼ 0 investors agree also on the copula C D of the random vector ðD 1 ; . . . ; D n Þ. This copula describes the complete non-linear dependence structure between firmsÕ default thresholds D i , as arising from the direct links between firms. We take this copula as given. Together with the marginal priors G i , the prior copula C D corresponds to a unique representation of investorsÕ joint prior threshold distribution G across firms:
At time t ¼ 0, investors start with the prior G, which describes the individual and joint uncertainty surrounding the firmsÕ default thresholds. With the passage of time, information on the default characteristics of firms becomes publicly available. Bond investors will rationally use all available public information to update their prior on any individual non-defaulted firmÕs default threshold. To study this learning procedure, we introduce the process ðS t Þ t P 0 , taking values in the power set PðIÞ of the firm index set I, by
The set S t is called the default scenario at t, since it collects the indices of all those bonds having defaulted by time t. By (2) and the continuity of the asset process V i , we get
Suppose some scenario s 2 PðIÞ appears at time t. Then investors know that
for all defaulted firms i 2 s and that D i < M i t for all operating firms i 2 I À s. That is, the default of a firm reveals the precise value of its threshold to the market, while the non-default status of a firm reveals that its threshold must be below the historical low of assets. With any default scenario appearing at time t we can hence associate a set BðM t ; ÁÞ 2 B n À such that fD 2 BðM t ; sÞg ¼ fS t ¼ sg:
In the following we relate the a posteriori belief to the prior. Lemma 4.1. Let L denote the joint law of D. On the set fS t ¼ sg, the a posteriori threshold belief is represented by the distribution
This Lemma allows to deduce the posteriori belief, i.e. the G t -conditional distribution function G t of the threshold vector D, from the prior G. 
We now use the familiar idea of a copula to separate the dependence structure from the conditional threshold distribution. We thus introduce the process ðC 
where u i 2 ½0; 1 is G t -measurable. Let us observe that C D and C D t are not equal in general; for an example we refer to Section 5.
The (''ordinary'') copula couples marginal distributions with the joint distribution of some random vector. The copula linking the marginal survival functions with the joint survival function is called survival copula, cf. Nelsen (1999) . Ordinary copula and survival copula express in an equivalent way the dependence structure of a given random vector. In analogy to ðC D t Þ t P 0 , we introduce the conditional survival threshold copula process ð C D t Þ t P 0 .
Lemma 4.3. The conditional survival threshold copula can be constructed from the conditional threshold copula via C D t ðu 1 ; . . . ; u n Þ ¼
where v j1 ¼ 1 À u j and v j2 ¼ 1 and u i 2 ½0; 1 is G t -measurable.
Default distribution
Viewing the historical asset low M i T for some fixed horizon T as a latent variable, ðM i T ; D i Þ i2I can be considered as a latent variable model with random cut-off levels D i . Here, default dependence arises from both dependence across the latent variables and dependence between the cut-off levels. We now characterize joint conditional default probabilities (5) implied by this model. These are the key for the solution of a variety of problems, such as the aggregation of correlated default risks, or the analysis of multi-name credit derivative instruments.
Proposition 4.4. The conditional joint default probability is for T i > t given by
Tn ÞÞ j G t : The marginal default probability of a firm i is for t < s i and t < T given by
More explicit expressions can be derived under additional assumptions on the asset process and the default scenario. 
Let us now turn to the implied contagion effects. For this, we fix an arbitrary firm i 2 I and suppose that this firm has direct ties, in the form of trade credits for example, with a number of other firms J I À fig. If we imagine firm i to be a supplier having granted trade credits to buying firms j 2 J , then we would expect the supplierÕs default threshold D i to depend on the thresholds D j of buyers j 2 J . Indeed, the supplier has to fund the loans, which affects its liabilities and hence its default threshold. The buyers incur directly new liabilities, which affect their respective default thresholds. If one buyer defaults on its obligations, we would expect a sudden increase in the supplierÕs default probability F i t ðT Þ, corresponding to a contagion effect.
Based on (11), consider the mapping t ! F i t ðT Þ for fixed T . Assuming that assets V i follow some sufficiently irregular but continuous process (Brownian motion for example), h i ðx; tÞ is continuous in t. But G i t ðxÞ will jump at the unpredictable default times s j < s i of buyers j 2 J . This is easily seen from Lemma 4.1, noting that there is a sudden change in the pertaining default scenario. Indeed, upon s j the default threshold of firm j becomes suddenly known to investors, who immediately update their a posteriori threshold belief G i t for the supplier i. This leads in turn to a jump in the estimated default probability F i t ðT Þ, which corresponds to a re-assessment of the supplierÕs financial health by bond investors in light of a buyerÕs default. We will illustrate these effects in an explicit example in Section 5, where we also consider the sign and the size of the jumps.
The implied bond prices exhibit an analogous pattern. Consider a defaultable zero bond 5 with maturity date T and a recovery payment of 1 À d i at T . We let d i 2 ½0; 1 be independent, with expected value d i . Furthermore, d i is G si -measurable, meaning that only at default the recovery becomes public knowledge. Let dðt; T Þ denote the time-t price of a default-free zero bond maturing at T . Assuming that defaults are independent of riskless interest rates, the defaultable zero bond has at time t < s i a price of
which is the value of a riskless zero bond less the expected default loss. From this it is clear that jumps in the default probability translate directly to jumps in the supplierÕs bond price upon defaults of buyers.
4.3. Default dependence structure 4.3.1. Default copula It is obvious from Proposition 4.4 and Example 4.5 that joint default probabilities F t depend critically on the nature of both historical asset low copula C M and the threshold copula C D . In analogy to Proposition 3.3, we have the following result, which relates these two copulas to the default (time) dependence structure C s .
Proposition 4.6. Assume that the unconditional default probability F i 0 is continuous and let J i denote its generalized inverse. The copula C s of the default times is for all u i 2 ½0; 1 given by
JnðunÞ ÞÞ:
The default dependence structure is therefore a function of both asset and threshold dependence structure, represented by C M and C D :
...;J n ðunÞ ðH 1 ðx 1 ; J 1 ðu 1 ÞÞ; . . . ; H n ðx n ; J n ðu n ÞÞÞ:
Under incomplete information, the joint default behavior of several firms and thus the level of aggregated credit risk, depends not only on the tail properties of the copula C M but also critically on those of C D . Given marginal default probabilities F i 0 , lower tail dependent copulas C M implying low values in all marginals simultaneously lead to an increased likelihood of joint defaults, corresponding to a high level of aggregate risk. Analogously, upper tail dependent copulas C D 0 implying low absolute threshold values in all marginals simultaneously induce higher joint default probabilities. We will illustrate these effects in Section 5.
In various applications it is often required to simulate correlated default times. In our model, having the default time copula C s at hand, we can proceed as follows. First, we generate a sample ðW 1 ; . . . ; W n Þ from C s . For details on appropriate algorithms we refer to Embrechts et al. (2001) . In a second step, we set r i ¼ J i ðW i Þ. It is easy to see that ðr 1 ; . . . ; r n Þ has joint distribution function F 0 , as desired.
Measuring default dependence
Besides providing instructive insights into the structure of joint defaults, the copula C s given by Proposition 4.6 also proves to be a sophisticated measure of default dependence. Indeed, C s uniquely describes the complete non-linear default (time) dependence structure.
6 As a joint distribution, C s satisfies a version of the Fr echetbounds inequality W À ðuÞ 6 C s ðuÞ 6 W þ ðuÞ for all u 2 ½0; 1 n . If C s ðuÞ ¼ W À ðuÞ ¼ maxðu 1 þ Á Á Á þ u n À n þ 1; 0Þ, then the defaults are perfectly negatively correlated (we speak of countermonotone defaults). If C s ðuÞ ¼ W þ ðuÞ ¼ minðu 1 ; . . . ; u n Þ, then the defaults are perfectly positively related (and we speak of comonotone defaults). If C s ¼ P, where Pðu 1 ; . . . ; u n Þ ¼ u 1 ; . . . ; u n , then the defaults are independent (this is the case if and only if assets and thresholds are independent, i.e. if C D ¼ C M t 1 ;...;tn ¼ P for all t i P 0). This suggests a partial order on the set of (default) copulas, which can allow a comparison of default time vectors.
Although a pairwise copula is easily constructed from the n-dimensional default copula by setting C s ð1; . . . ; 1; u; 1; . . . ; 1; v; 1; . . . ; 1Þ, a scalar-valued pairwise dependence measure can perhaps provide more intuition about the degree of pertaining default dependence. We can define, for example, SpearmanÕs rank default correlation measuring the degree of monotonic dependence, by
where q is the ordinary linear (product-moment) correlation. Thus q S is the linear correlation of the copula C s . By using the definition of linear correlation,
showing that SpearmanÕs rank correlation depends on the copula only. Also, q S is seen to be a scaled version of the signed volume enclosed by the copula C s and the product copula Pðu; vÞ ¼ uv. Thus q S is a measure of the average distance between the actual distribution of ðs i ; s j Þ and their distribution given independence. Besides being invariant under (strictly) increasing transformations, q S has the following useful properties, which are easily verified using (14):
The default copula itself and the default copula based rank default correlation measures suggested above capture the complete non-linear default dependence; they should be preferred over the existing default correlation measures based on linear correlation q. Although simple measures such as qð1 ft P sig ; 1 ft P sjg Þ or qðs i À t; s j À tÞ are widely used in the literature (see, for example, Zhou, 2001; Hull and White, 2000b; Kealhofer, 1998; Lucas, 1995; Li, 2000) , they are fundamentally flawed. As recently analyzed in detail by Embrechts et al. (2001) , covariance is not the natural measure of dependence for non-elliptical random vectors such as ð1 ft P sig ; 1 ft P sjg Þ and ðs i ; s j Þ. Using linear correlation in this context has severe limitations, since only the linear part of the dependence structure is captured.
An explicit example
In the previous sections we have made no specific assumptions on the asset dynamics and the prior threshold belief of investors. In this section we illustrate the implications of our model in the two-firm case based on geometric Brownian motion and uniform priors. The explicit results extend straightforwardly to the higherdimensional case.
Assets and prior
We consider a bond market where bonds of two firms, labelled 1 and 2, are traded. For concreteness, we think of Firm 2 as directly supplying goods to Firm 1, which enters in a trade credit with Firm 2. It is natural to consider these firms as positively dependent: if Firm 1 defaults on its obligation from the trade credit, this immediately reduces the cash flow of Firm 2, making it more default-risky (supposing the collateral value of the traded goods is sufficiently low). Investors agree that the total market value Z i of each firm i follows a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.
where l i 2 R and r i > 0 are constant drift and volatility parameters, respectively, and where W i is a standard Brownian motion. In order to focus on the contagion effects associated with the direct linkages between buyer and supplier, we suppose that the firm values itself are not correlated (cyclical default correlations are hence not present). From now on, we consider the log-firm value as the ''asset process'' V i in the sense of the previous sections. That is, we set V i t ¼ l i t þ r i W i t for i ¼ 1; 2, so that V i is a Brownian motion starting at zero. Notice that the copula of the historical asset low satisfies C M t 1 ;t 2 ¼ P for all pairs ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ 2 R 2 þ , due to the W i being independent.
The incomplete information available to the secondary market is modeled by the filtration ðG t Þ t P 0 , which is generated by the firm value processes and the default indicator processes. At time t ¼ 0, investors agree on a marginal prior on firmsÕ default thresholds with respect to the firm values Z i , which we assume to be uniform 7 on ð0; Z i 0 Þ. Besides the marginal prior which models the idiosyncratic threshold uncertainty, we suppose that investors also agree on the Clayton copula family
as a parametric description 8 of the dependence structure between firmsÕ thresholds, including the value of the parameter h > 0. This parameter specifies the degree of threshold dependence associated with Cðu; v; hÞ. We have lim h!1 Cðu; v; hÞ ¼ W þ ðu; vÞ, reflecting perfect positive dependence, as well as lim h!0 Cðu; v; hÞ ¼ Pðu; vÞ, corresponding to independence. As scalar-valued measure of threshold dependence in relation to the parameter h we consider KendallÕs rank correlation q K , given by
This shows that q K is determined by the copula only and is thus invariant under strictly increasing transformations of the thresholds. Notice that for h > 0, we have q K 2 ½0; 1, reflecting the positive dependence between the firms. Under these assumptions, the prior with respect to the log-firm values V i is as follows. 
Belief updating
Let us suppose that s 1 < s 2 almost surely. That is, the buyer defaults before the supplier, so that we can examine the adverse effects of this event (the contagion effects) on the supplier. Taking into account Lemma 5.1, the conditional joint law of D follows from Lemma 4.1 by straightforward calculations.
We emphasize that this result, along with the previous ones, can be straightforwardly extended to the general n-firm case with n > 2. 
Contagion effects
We now turn to the implications of the direct relationships between buyer and supplier, corresponding to the threshold dependence structure C D ðu; v; hÞ. horizons T when both firms operate. The supplierÕs current asset value is set to V 2 t ¼ À0:05. Somewhat surprising at a first glance, F t ðT ; hÞ decreases in the degree of association h. The intuition here is that, given a positive degree of monotonic association between the firms, the information that the buyer is still operating at time t and is hence honoring its obligations to the supplier, signals bond investors that the supplier is doing well (at least with respect to the relationship to the buyer). Basically, the stronger the association (the higher h), the more convincing is the fact that the buyer operates and repays its debt to the supplier, leading to lower default probabilities of the supplier as perceived by bond investors. Fig. 3 shows the supplierÕs conditional default probabilities as a function of h if the buyer has already defaulted. We see that in this case F 2 t ðT ; hÞ is increasing in h. Here the intuition is as follows: with positive association between the firms, the default of the buyer lets investors ''downgrade'' the supplier, since the supplier typically suffers losses from this default. The stronger the dependence, the more affected is the supplier, and the more severe is the downgrade. The effect of a given change of h on F 2 t ðT ; hÞ is for all horizons higher if the buyer has defaulted, compared to the case where it still operates.
We now consider the jump in the supplierÕs conditional default probability upon the default of the buyer, in dependence of h. For a time horizon of T ¼ 12 months, Fig. 4 shows F 2 t ðT ; hÞ when both firms still operate at t and when the buyer defaults at t. For a given h, the difference between the curves is the jump that the supplierÕs default probability would experience upon the buyerÕs default. Quite intuitive, the jump size is increasing in h. Clearly, if there is no relation between the firms, the default status of the buyer does not affect the suppliers default probability. Note that the jump effect is critically dependent on the time horizon T . Fairly intuitive, with T ! 0 the jump effect vanishes.
Portfolio default risk
We now consider a stylized portfolio composed of one zero-recovery zero-coupon bond issued by the buyer and one issued by the supplier. From a risk measurement and management perspective we are interested in the distribution of aggregate losses N T ¼ 1 fs 1 6 T g þ 1 fs 2 6 T g . As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the shape of this distribution will be closely related to the nature of the threshold copula C D . Specifically, upper tail dependent C D will imply higher aggregate loss fluctuations, corresponding to a higher risk of the portfolio. To study this issue, we consider the variance Var½N T for two different copula families. The first is the Clayton copula (16), which exhibits lower tail dependence (see Lindskog, 2000 , for example). The second is the Gumbel copula pendence, Var Gu ½N T exceeds Var Cl ½N T by a factor of at most 2.3. Even for fixed (i.e. calibrated) monotonic threshold dependence q K , upper tail dependent copulas seems to induce fatter tails, i.e. higher loss fluctuations, than lower tail dependent ones. This points to the existence of model risk in choosing the ''right'' threshold copula; it parallels the finding of Frey and McNeil (2001) on asset copulas in latent variable models ðV i T ; D i Þ i2I with perfect information.
Conclusion
A thorough understanding of correlated multi-firm default mechanisms is of importance for corporate security valuation, design of credit derivatives, risk measurement and management in financial institutions, and the supervision of financial markets.
In this paper we distinguish between two correlation mechanisms: cyclical correlation and default contagion. Cyclical correlation between firms is due to their dependence on common smoothly varying macro-economic factors. Contagion between defaults of firms having direct ties to each other, for example through a parent-subsidiary relationship, refers to sudden jumps in credit spreads, which are correlated across several firms. If adverse contagion-induced spread jumps appear on a larger scale, they typically lead to sudden excessive losses in the credit portfolios of financial institutions, which need to be promptly covered through sufficient capital reserves. An explicit modeling of contagion effects is therefore particularly important, from both a risk management and a banking regulatory point of view.
We propose a structural model of correlated default, where firms are subject to both cyclical correlation and direct contagion processes. In our model contagion between defaults of related firms is due to public bond investorsÕ complete information on firmsÕ characteristics. Such incomplete information of investors was a major issue in the recent defaults of Enron or WorldCom. From observing the default status of the firms in the market, investors learn over time about the unknown characteristics. Specifically, an unexpected default leads to ''surprise'' updates of investorsÕ prior beliefs, which imply jumps in default probabilities and credit spreads in accordance with stylized empirical facts. By accommodating such information-based contagion effects, in comparison with the asset value-based standard industry models KMV and CreditMetrics, our model leads to an improved estimate of correlated default risk.
Our results indicate that the disclosure of information matters a lot: increased transparency reduces the likelihood of contagion effects due to incomplete information of investors. Regulatory policy should thus support information disclosure of firms.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.3. As a corollary to SklarÕs Theorem, for continuous marginals F i 0 we can construct the (unconditional) default time copula C s by means of the quantile functions J i of the default times s i : C s ðu 1 ; . . . ; u n Þ ¼ F 0 ðJ i ðu 1 Þ; . . . ; J n ðu n ÞÞ:
The statement then follows immediately from (5) in case t ¼ 0. h Proof of Lemma 4.1. Since M t 2 F t & G t , from the structure of the r-field rðs^tÞ 9 and from BayesÕ Theorem, on the set fS t ¼ sg we have P ½D 2 A j G t ¼ P ½D 2 A j rðs^tÞ _ F t ¼ P ½D 2 A j D 2 BðM t ; sÞ; F t ¼ P ½D 2 A \ BðM t ; sÞ j F t P ½D 2 BðM t ; sÞ j F t :
This implies our assertion because D is independent of F t . h The r-field rðs^tÞ G t is generated by the events fs i 6 ug ¼ fM i u 6 D i g for u 6 t and i 2 S t as well as the atoms fs i > tg ¼ fM Using the fact that V 1 and V 2 are independent, and hence P ½M 
